

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04069 01 OF 02 161415Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7278
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 04069

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF PLENARY MEETING,
MARCH 15

CTB MESSAGE NO. 173

1. SUMMARY. WARNKE (US) DELIVERED STATEMENT (SEPTTEL)
EMPHASIZING THAT INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS (ISIS)
SHOULD PLAY INTEGRAL ROLE IN TREATY VERIFICATION AND
REACTING TO EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS. STATEMENT SAID
US WAS CONSIDERING ISI NETWORKS RANGING UP TO 20 INSTALLA-
TIONS AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER INTERIM
ARRANGEMENTS IF ISIS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE,
PROVIDED FUNDAMENTAL US OBJECTIVES WERE MET. CRADOCK (UK)
READ STATEMENT (SEPTTEL) SUMMARIZING VIEWS ON ON-SITE
INSPECTION (OSI). MOROKHOV (USSR) REACTED INITIALLY TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04069 01 OF 02 161415Z

WARNKE'S STATEMENT BY SAYING IT CONTAINED BOTH POSITIVE
AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS BUT THAT SOVIETS COULD NOT ACCEPT
THE "NEW IDEA" THAT ISIS SHOULD PLAY AN INTEGRAL ROLE IN
TREATY VERIFICATION. MOROKHOV THEN INTRODUCED A DRAFT
TEXT FOR THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT (SEPTTEL),
EMPHASIZING THAT IT WAS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT NTM
SUPPLEMENTED BY INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE (ISDE)

WAS FULLY ADEQUATE FOR VERIFICATION. WARNKE REACTED STRONGLY TO MOROKHOV COMMENTS, SAYING THERE WAS NOTHING NEW ABOUT US POSITION THAT NTM ALONE WAS NOT ADEQUATE FOR CTB VERIFICATION. IN POST PLENARY HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, MOROKHOV SAID HIS DRAFT TEXT WENT BEYOND HIS EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS, THAT IT WAS DESIGNED TO ACCELERATE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT HE EXPECTED US TO REDO IT. END SUMMARY.

2. WARNKE DELIVERED STATEMENT REACTING TO SOVIET COMMENTS ON ISIS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT INTERNAL STATIONS SHOULD PLAY AN INTEGRAL ROLE IN VERIFYING TREATY COMPLIANCE AND THAT NO ARBITRARY LIMITS SHOULD BE PUT ON THEIR CAPABILITY. US FELT IT WAS IN INTERESTS OF ALL THAT ALL DATA FROM ISIS BE PROVIDED ON A ROUTINE BASIS. HE SAID SOVIET CONCERNS THAT ISIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION, AND OFFERED TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL ANY SPECIFIC CONCERNS THE SOVIET DEL MIGHT HAVE. THE US ALSO COULD NOT AGREE THAT ISIS INFRINGED SOVEREIGNTY IN ANY WAY. WARNKE REFERRED TO THE SOVIET DEL CONCERN ABOUT NUMBERS OF ISIS AND SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE US COULD NOT NOW PROPOSE A SPECIFIC NUMBER, NETWORKS RANGING UP TO AROUND 20 INSTALLATIONS WERE BEING EXAMINED. INCLUSION OF ARRAYS COULD REDUCE THE NUMBER. ISIS COULD BE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF EXISTING NATIONAL STATIONS PROVIDED THESE SITES WERE TECHNICALLY SUITABLE AND FELL WITHIN THE GENERAL AREA AGREED ON

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04069 01 OF 02 161415Z

DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. FINALLY, WARNKE NOTED THE SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT PROVIDING FOR VERIFICATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND SAID THE US DEL WAS PREPARED TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD PROVIDED FUNDAMENTAL US OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED WERE MET. EQUIPMENT WOULD BE BASED ON AVAILABLE BUT ADVANCED EQUIPMENT SUCH AS EQUIPMENT USED FOR SEISMIC RESEARCH OBSERVATORIES AND INCLUDE AUTHENTICATION. JCC COULD PLAY A ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING ISI NETWORK, BUT EXPLICIT AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED FIRST ON KEY VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES AND TARGET DATES FOR INSTALLATION.

3. CRADOCK PROVIDED RESPONSE (SEPTEL) TO SOVIET DEL STATEMENT ON OSI OF 10 MARCH. HE SUMMARIZED WESTERN POSITION AND CRITIQUED SOVIET VIEWS ON OBJECTIVES OF OSI, DEFINITION OF EVENT WHICH WOULD QUALIFY FOR OSI, WHAT TYPE OF EVIDENCE COULD BE ADVANCED IN SUPPORT OF OSI REQUEST, PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH OSI REQUESTS, AND RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS.

4. MOROKHOV MADE PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON WARNKE'S STATE-

MENT, SAYING THAT US VIEW ON THE INTEGRAL ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY ISIS WAS A NEW CONCEPT. WHILE SOV DEL WOULD STUDY IT, HE COULD SAY NOW THAT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE. SECONDLY, MOROKHOV SAID IT WAS THE PREROGATIVE OF EACH STATE TO DETERMINE WHETHER A THREAT TO ITS NATIONAL SECURITY EXISTED. HE WOULD NOT PRESUME TO SAY WHETHER A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT EXISTED FOR THE US OR UK. 5. MOROKHOV THEN TURNED TO A PREPARED STATEMENT, SAYING HE WANTED THE SOVIET POSITION TO BE COMPLETELY CLEAR. HE SAID HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US AND UK DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET VIEW OF WHAT WOULD BE A SUITABLE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. IT WAS A PROPO-

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 04069 02 OF 02 161419Z
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SITION OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT NTM SUPPLEMENTED BY ISDE WAS QUITE SUFFICIENT TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER OTHER MEASURES SUCH AS VOLUNTARY OSI AND AGREED EQUIPMENT AT NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS WAS BASED STRICTLY ON THEIR DESIRE TO FACILITATE THE SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF A TREATY. TAKING THIS INTO ACCOUNT, THE SOVIET DEL HAD PREPARED TENTATIVE DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. MOROKHOV STRESSED THAT IN PREPARING THE

LANGUAGE THEY HAD TRIED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE
TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY THE US.

6. MOROKHOV THEN DISTRIBUTED TENTATIVE DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR
THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS AD REFEREN-
DUM TO HIS GOVERNMENT (SEPTTEL). LANGUAGE COVERED DATA
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 04069 02 OF 02 161419Z

EXCHANGE FROM NATIONAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS WITH AGREED
EQUIPMENT, OSI INITIATION AND RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS, AND
JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. LANGUAGE ON SEISMIC
INSTALLATIONS AND OSI FOLLOWS KNOWN SOVIET VIEWS, WITH
MOST SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS ON SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS AND
OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS DEFERRED TO JCC.

7. WARNKE RESPONDED STRONGLY TO MOROKHOV'S INITIAL REAC-
TION TO STATEMENT, SAYING HE WAS EXTRAORDINARILY SURPRISED
BY VIEW THAT US DEL HAD ADVANCED A NEW CONCEPT FOR THE
ROLE OF ISIS. HE THOUGHT THERE COULD NOT BE THE SLIGHTEST
DOUBT THAT WE DID NOT REGARD NTM SUPPLEMENTED BY ISDE AS
ADEQUATE TO VERIFY A CTB. US DEL HAD CONSISTENTLY PRO-
POSED AN INTEGRATED VERIFICATION PACKAGE BECAUSE OF OUR
FIRM BELIEF THAT NTM ALONE WAS INSUFFICIENT. US DEL HAD
ADVANCED SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS IN REACTION TO SOVIET
PROPOSALS; MOVING TO VOLUNTARY OSI AND MODIFYING OUR
CONCEPT OF ISIS. ALL WE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET DEL
WAS CONTRADICTORY REACTIONS THAT OUR PROPOSALS WERE BOTH
TOO DETAILED AND YET UNCLEAR. THESE WERE NOT TRIVIAL
MATTERS OF A COSMETIC NATURE BUT WERE NECESSARY TO ENSURE
THE VERIFIABILITY OF A CTB.

8. IN POST PLENARY HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, MOROKHOV
SAID DRAFT TEXT WAS TABLED ON HIS INITIATIVE TO "HELP
THINGS ALONG" AND WENT BEYOND HIS INSTRUCTIONS. HE
EXPECTED US DEL TO REDO TEXT SINCE SEPARATE AGREEMENT WAS
US IDEA. MOROKHOV ALSO SAID THAT HIS PLENARY STATEMENTS
"SHOULDN'T BE TAKEN TOO SERIOUSLY" AND THAT THE IMPORTANT
THINGS WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN RESTRICTED SESSIONS.

9. RESTRICTED PLENARY SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY TO DISCUSS
SOVIET DRAFT OF SEPARATE AGREEMENT. WARNKE
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PAGE 03 GENEVA 04069 02 OF 02 161419Z

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